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What is the place of theories of nationalism in a transnational age ? 
Murray Pittock, University of Glasgow 
For most of the twentieth century, nationalism was the paradoxical reality which 
Marxism- particularly in its dimension as a stadial and predictive historical model-
failed to address. After what might be called the ‘short’ twentieth century, the period 
between 1914 and 1989, drew to a close, it began to become apparent that nationalism 
was to become the paradoxical reality in a new historical phase, that of globalization, 
just as it had been in the age of Marxism. This brief paper sets out to address the 
persistence of nationalism, the equally persistent fashion of ignoring the implications 
of its longevity or denying them, and the limited success offered by theories of 
nationalism in offering an account of these phenomena because of a frequently 
occurring bias to the metropolitan, cosmopolitan and transnational in the accounts 
they offer.  
 In what might be seen as a part of the first phase of the transition from Marxism to 
globalization, the nationalities question was as prominent as it had been on the eve of 
the publication of the Manifesto of the Communist Party in 1848. The nationalities 
problem of the Austro-Hungarian empire recrudesced in the slow collapse of 
Yugoslavia, which-after witnessing the emergence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia (and Kosovo), has culminated (to date) in the 
restoration of Montenegrin independence in 2006. The ‘Oblast of Cettinje’ of 1922, 
the ‘Zeta Bannovina’ of the 1930s and the Socialist Republic run from Titograd alike 
dissolved, and the state that Mirko, the Grand Duke of Grahovo, would have 
recognized a century and a half earlier, came back into being. In 2004, the Royal 
Standard of King Nikola I formed the basis for the new national flag; in 2011, the 
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Royal Family of Montenegro were again recognized by its government. The 
population of this old new state is less than half that of the Glasgow travel to work 
area.  
In the process of Montenegrin independence, as with the process of independence in 
other countries, it seems that previous struggles with Serbia and the Ottoman Empire 
ultimately counted for more than the stadial modelling of state development, whether 
carried out by Whig or Marxist historians or by social scientists. Places, boundaries, 
memories, loyalties and faith all shift more slowly than the models used to describe 
them either noted or predicted. The history of the Balkans, and specifically Serbia’s 
historic role as a local ‘great power’ which had long been held in check by Austrian 
and Ottoman regional hegemony, were better guides to the end of Yugoslavia than 
politicians, diplomats or political analysts. In 1992, the present writer heard a 
mediaeval historian in Inverness state that Serbia’s role in the disruption of nation 
formation in the Balkans would only end with the deployment of international air 
power over Serbian territory. In 1999, NATO took his advice, though they had never 
heard it. It struck me then, as it does now, that the predictive power of detailed 
historical knowledge in these questions far outperforms the ability of cultural or 
nationalist theory, or any historyless social science data, to do what it claims: to 
provide a coherent account of the phenomena it sets out to explain. Rather, it tells its 
audience what they already want to hear. Mediaeval historians tend not to endorse 
modernist theories of nationalism: as Susan Reynolds argued in Kingdoms and 
Communities in Western Europe (900-1300) in 1984 (2nd ed. 1997), the mediaeval 
idea of a kingdom differs little from the ‘nation’ of the present age.   
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Globalization is the second guarantor of the end of nationalism. As Ulrich Beck has 
argued in The Cosmopolitan Vision (2006) and elsewhere, and as has been observed 
with rather less rigour in the media, there is a trend towards intellectual analysis of the 
borderless activities of intellectual and technological elites, based on research often 
carried out from within those elites themselves. Against what he calls 
‘methodological nationalism’, Beck advances (borrowing from Billig (1995)) the 
concept of ‘banal cosmopolitanism’ which is marked by the emergence of multiple 
loyalties and cultural mixing. While some of this cosmopolitanism is programmatic, 
much is passively absorbed as the by-product of trends in global consumerism and 
flows of capital, including human capital. The borrowing of Billig’s concept of ‘banal 
nationalism’ is instructive. As a contemporary concept which appears to imply the 
exact opposite of the use it is put to by Beck, it reveals that once again nationalism is 
the underlying paradox of globalization, the identification of ‘proximities over 
distances and distances within proximity’, as Beck has put it in another context 
(Pittock (2003), 1 ff.). This violation of the historic pattern of spatial relationships 
seems to be an invitation constructed by the media and now virtual reality to join a 
new global community. It is part of Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ (1989). Yet since 
Fukuyama’s updated version of Hegel proclaimed the collapse of Marxist stadialism 
and the triumph of a borderless Western democracy, the following states have 
becoming independent: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, East Timor,  Eritrea,  
Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR 
Macedonia, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Moldova, Montenegro, Namibia, 
Palau, Serbia, Slovakia,  Slovenia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan. 
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The end of history has been the beginning or renewal of history for 29 independent 
states (or more if you count state divisions). Moreover, within Canada a referendum 
for the independence of Quebec has been lost by the narrowest of margins (1995), 
while even in Beck’s cosmopolitan heartland of the European Union, Belgium is a 
flag of convenience for Flanders and Wallonia, the Spanish Government dare not 
allow Catalans to vote on their future, Scotland in its mild and crabwise way begins 
slide out of its union with England, while many other secessionist and autonomous 
movements are active. If sociological cosmopolitan theory exists to explain society, 
what is its explanatory or predictive value ? Fukuyama’s implausibly optimistic thesis 
has fallen under the roadside bombs of Iraq and the intractability of the Afghan 
resistance to occupation. So much for the ineluctable triumph of borderless Western 
democracy: civilization is not butter, and it cannot be spread by the sword. But the 
globalizing thesis still remains intact. Edmund Burke may have thought the nature of 
things a sturdy adversary, but it is no obstacle to the creation of cultural theories, 
though it still is needed for scientific ones. There is-as I will argue in the rest of this 
paper- in truth a distaste for nationalism among many in the academic community, a 
distaste which expresses itself (even, as we shall see, among theorists of nationalism) 
in claiming that the phenomenon which surrounds them does not exist, or that it is the 
product of false or primitive consciousness. Those who take nationalism seriously are 
not infrequently accused of bias, but can there be a greater bias than is evident in 
offering accounts of reality which do not correspond to it, let alone begin to explain 
it ? That is not to say that there is no cosmopolitanism and no globalization, or that 
these are illegitimate phenomena into which to enquire: simply that one size does not 
fit all. Nationalism rests on particular histories and theories on general trends: and 
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theorists of nationalism often find the huge amounts of discrete datasets difficult to 
manage. And they do not always try. 
To begin with, the high-level explanatory categories which are adopted as premises 
are not themselves neutral descriptors. To take ‘globalization’, the term does not 
usually refer to a ‘cosmopolitan’ process whereby different traditions are hybridized 
or fused: instead it is normally a shorthand for the ubiquity of American or American 
related soft power in business systems, commercial penetration, media, the use of 
English and so forth. Although this can hybridize with local or compatible value 
systems, it often does so imperfectly (California is both a highly mobile society and 
one where racism remaims a major perceived problem). Where the gap between the 
local system and soft Americanization is too strong for hybridization to take place, 
resistance can be fierce. There is numerically vestigial though highly activist 
resistance from the old ideological Left and from environmentalists; but the resistance 
from Islam, which among major religions makes strong and particular demands on 
lifestyle and business conduct, is much stronger. The guilt-free consumerism that 
‘globalization’ brings in its wake is incompatible with Islam: but Islam is not quite 
alone. Religious believers who do more than acquiesce in the tenets of their faith, but 
instead defend them, are incompatible with ‘globalization’. Their statements of values 
leads to hostility in Europe to Catholics, in the Anglican Communion to African 
bishops and in the West in general to Islam. Frequently, these believers are described 
as out of date or even ‘mediaeval’ in their beliefs: a sure sign that beneath the 
cosmopolite dress of globalization lurks the cloven hoof of stadialism, where some 
societies are more advanced than others, and the United States is the most advanced 
of all. ‘Globalization’’s cosmopolitanism is not a free and equal hybridity, a rainbow 
of human value: it is the willingness to be subsumed under the sign of a relatively 
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narrow set of cultural practices which are strongly associated with the transnational 
power of major corporations and their parent culture. The strongly presentist 
judgements of social science not infrequently follow the pattern of that power. Since 
the financial crisis of 2008, we have seen increasing interest in questions such as 
whether democracy is positive for economic growth, and renewed interest in the 
German way of Mittelstand in company and market formation. These are-quite 
simply-likely to be responses to Asian growth, the strength of German manufacturing 
and American indebtedness. New interests, new received wisdoms, new paradigms 
are brought to the fore by new conditions. The end of history has survived a major 
economic downturn as badly as it has weathered Islam.  
Banal cosmopolitanism then turns out, like globalization, to be a rather unstable 
concept, its claim to stability being reliant on the end of a history which is clearly all 
too renewable. There are other concepts with which it does not fit-and that may be 
true of Billig’s ‘banal nationalism’ itself, because the authority of banality is 
undermined by the increasing banality of authority. The application of a range of 
approaches-not least among them classical rhetorical theory- indicates that authority 
is a wasting asset in Western societies. If that is the case, does the official routine 
reinscription of the ideology of nationality work any more, or is it too a wasting 
asset ? Is the quotidian unity of the nation-state as unstable as the inevitable spread of 
globalization, internationalism and cosmopolitanism ? How else can Spain and Great 
Britain find it so hard to present themselves as nationally unified to their minority 
nations ? And what is the point of doing so anyway, when Catalunya effectively has 
embassies abroad and Scotland possesses a longstanding international identity as a 
nation ? 
Theories of nationalism often have a difficult time with all these issues. If we examine 
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Gellner’s model in Nationalism for national emergence, we can note his identification 
of five stages, which are based on a stadialist historical model, with its roots in the 
French Revolutionary era. Its roots are in the Congress of Vienna; it moves through 
‘the first nationalist rising…that of the Greeks’ to Versailles and beyond to the 
‘nationalist virulence’ of the 1930s (Gellner (1998): 41, 45, 49).  
 
This is a powerful model. It shares with many theories of nationalism an idea of the 
centrality of the French Revolutionary era. But it clearly-almost without examining it 
in any detail-gives rise to a number of problems. First, it is a victim of its own 
European historical period in supposing the nationality is ethnic: here Gellner is 
Herderian as befits the French Revolutionary era, but he is not American. The 
Thirteen Colonies came to independence in the 1780s, but they did so as a Republic 
based on institutions, not Volkisch sentiment- and the same can be said of (Quebec 
aside) the gradual convergence of Canada between the Confederation of 1867 and the 
accession of Newfoundland in 1949. Nationality of origin is not nugatory in the 
United States, but it hardly meets the criteria for ethno-cultural particularism. 
Secondly, agitations against dynastic empires do not have to be based on such 
sentiment (the Austrian example is clearly over-influential on Gellner, possibly due to 
his Czech origin), nor do dynastic polities have to be multinational: Catalonia fought 
Spain in the early eighteenth century on constitutional grounds, and the Stewart 
dynasty in Scotland was viewed by many as isomorphic with Scottish independence. 
The idea that there are ‘minorities’ to be assimilated or persecuted also-like the whole 
tone of a model which sets nationalism up as a challenge to the status quo, as if 
existing borders were not the product of previous nationalisms-reinforces a bias 
against the subject ostensibly being investigated.  Not only is Gellner’s Stage 4 
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‘Ethnic Cleansing’ (Gellner (1998): 44-45), but his descriptions of nationalism as a 
phenomenon can hardly be said to lie within the boundaries of academic discourse. 
Nationalism is associated with ‘anger’, ‘bitterness’, ‘enormous suffering’ and linked 
to the Nazis. Chapter 8 is even called ‘The murderous virulence of nationalism’ (8, 59, 
102). Moreover, Gellner claims that ‘in many societies and many historical periods, 
nationalism is conspicuous by its absence’ and that nationalists fail ‘to cope with this 
fact’, a fact demonstrated only by its being asserted. Gellner claims that ‘the frequent 
absence of nationalist turbulence in the human past does indeed provide the 
nationalist with a problem’, as if ‘turbulence’ alone was the mark of nation formation 
(7-8). Few societies were more stable for longer than Ancient Egypt, and the sense of 
being Egyptian comes through strongly from ancient texts, just as the sense of being 
an Israelite does. The tomb of Seti I depicts four peoples of the world: Syrians, 
Nubians, Libyans and Egyptians in an early predecessor of the Volkertafel of the 
sixteenth century; similar depictions with different nationalities can be found in the 
palace of Rameses III at Medinet Habu. Gellner’s model-forgivably in the light of his 
personal history-is far too tinged with reading history backwards from the Nazis to the 
Balkan conflicts of the nineteenth century. He does allow for other developmental 
models, but does little to explore them. His statement that ‘backward 
populations…have a clear interest in secession’ shows that his view of nation 
formation is at root both stadialist and pejorative towards nationalism as a category 
(35).  
 
In Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Eric Hobsbawm argues that nations develop 
top-down with the masses the last to be affected by national consciousness: 
nationalism is consumed by the populace, but not produced by them, and is implicitly 
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contrary to their interests. Hobsbawm places the rise of nations as no earlier than 1800 
and their apogee even later (1870-1950, and to some degree 1918-1950): in doing so, 
he neatly aligns nationalism with European empires, both World Wars and the Third 
Reich, a very good example of how to frame memory in a manner which emphasizes 
the toxicity of the historical category which one is investigating (‘nationalist and 
racist’ is a Hobsbawmian conjunction). In arguing, for example, that nacíon des not 
appear in the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy until 1884, Hobsbawm 
chooses his examples carefully: ‘Of Ingland the nacion Es Inglis man thar in commun’ 
dates from 1300 and ‘Be cause I am a natyff Scottish man’ from Blin Hary’s Wallace 
(1470), an explicitly nationalist text (Hobsbawm (1992): 2, 14, 73, 131 ff; Pittock 
(1999): 21).  
The doctrine of modernism is important in this and similar frameworks of memory as 
it allows culpability to be ascribed to nationalism. It allots nationalism a historical 
moment (whether that is Bhabha or Gellner’s French Revolution or Anderson’s print 
revolution), instead of being a force of nature, a natural state towards which people 
naturally tend. In this context, statements such as ‘It is better  for us to die in battle 
than to see the misfortunes of our nation’ (1 Maccabees 3:59, New Jerusalem Bible) 
and ‘as long as but a hundred of us remain alive, never will we on any conditions be 
brought under English rule’ (Declaration of Arbroath 1320) have to be ignored, 
reinterpreted beyond what language can bear or simply attributed to an ‘elite’, as if 
the documents of the American Founding Fathers, the Girondins or Young Ireland 
were the product of demotic authenticity. 
 
In his essay on ‘The Origins of Nations’ (1989), Anthony Smith argues that the five 
features of a civic nation are ‘an active, assertive and politicized community’, ‘clearly 
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demarcated territory’, a ‘homeland’; economic autarchy, common laws and education 
in ‘national values, myths and memories’ (Smith (1989): 349-56). Here then is a 
nation on all these counts summed up in two lines from over 2, 400 years ago: 
 
Ω ΞΕΙΝ ΑΓΓΕΛΛΕΙΝ ΛΑΚΕΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΟΙΣ ΟΤΙ ΤΗΔΕ ΚΕΙΜΕΘΑ ΤΟΙΣ ΚΕΙΝΩΝ 
ΡΗΜΑΣΙ ΠΕΙΘΟΜΕΝΟΙ 
(O Stranger, announce to the Spartans that here we lie, obedient to their laws).  
 
Simonides (556-468BC) (or pseudo-Simonides’) epitaph for the Spartan dead stresses 
belonging (as witnessed by the outsider, the stranger), the nature of the community 
belonged to (‘Sparta’), sacrifice for that community and the binding nature of the 
legal and customary obligations which made the sacrifice at Thermopylae both 
imperative and typical of what it is to be ‘Spartan’ (‘Laws’ is an imperfect translation, 
but ‘orders’ is a worse one, with its incorrect implications of a military chain of 
command).  
 
Is Sparta a multi-kingdom dynastic monarchy, or is it closer to a nation state ? It did 
of course have strong racial self-definition and also a distinct language in Laconian 
Doric (its descendant Tsakonian is still spoken in the Peleponnese). But the antiquity 
of Simonides’ sentiments are closer to much older definitions of nationalism than 
those fashionable today: those of the Breton Ernest Renan, for example, who argued 
for the importance of the legacy of memory and shared sacrifices (popularly held, not 
imposed by an elite) to the definition of nationality as a ‘solidarity’ which transcends 
(though it may engage) issues of race, religion and language.  
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In concluding this essay, I would wish to emphasize three things. The first is that 
ethno-linguistic particularism is-although important to many kinds of nationalism-
clearly inadequate as a basis for a fully-fledged theoretical account of the 
phenomenon, and that more traditional or nuanced accounts such as those of Renan, 
Smith or historians of mediaeval law or communities have more comprehensive 
validity. Secondly, nationality is by its nature particular, even if not particularist or 
essentialist in ethno-cultural terms: hence attempts to overlook individual histories in 
constructing general theory are at risk of a carelessness with regard to relevant details. 
It is not good enough to simply invoke ‘nationalism’ as a general category then claim 
that it is not a near-universally observable phenomenon without alluding to a vast 
multiplicity of examples, but such empty assertions have been regarded as acceptable 
from the most highly respected scholars in the area. Time and again in predicting the 
course of modern nationalism, regional history has proved a better guide than global 
theory. Thirdly, theorists of nationalism are often guilty of a kind of metanationalism, 
conceiving themselves as being independent of nationality. Yet we all belong 
somewhere, or long to: such is the human condition. In claiming to stand apart from 
nationality while often reflecting adversely on current threats to state integrity, many 
theorists surreptitiously endorse the status quo. Their nation is not a nation: it is 
normality; your nation, my nation on the other hand, may just be an irridentist region 
in the grip of a delusive post French Revolutionary fervour cynically manipulated by 
its elites. Thus do elites perpetuate themselves by deprecating the existence of ‘elites’ 
as a category in the objectified world of enquiry to which they pretend. Nationalism is 
for many of its theorists not a neutral category, but the ‘other’; as for the validity of 
the borderless cosmopolitan realm, the tensions in Europe in 2012 within and between 
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nations tell their own story. Whatever the theorists say, the nature of things remains a 
sturdy adversary.  
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